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ABSTRACT—This Symposium Essay asks what a largely forgotten conflict
over habeas corpus and martial law in mid-eighteenth-century New York can
tell us about originalist methods of constitutional interpretation. The episode,
which involved Abraham Yates, Jr.—later a prominent Antifederalist—as
well as Lord Loudoun, the commander of the British forces in America, and
New York Acting Governor James De Lancey, furnishes insights into
debates about martial law prior to the Founding and indicates that they may
have bearing on originalist interpretations of the Suspension Clause. It also
demonstrates how the British imperial context in which the American
colonies were situated shaped discussions about rights in ways that
originalism should address. In particular, colonists argued with colonial
officials both explicitly and implicitly about the extent to which statutes as
well as common law applied in the colonies. These contested statutory
schemes should affect how we understand constitutional provisions: for
example, they might suggest that statutes pertaining to martial law should be
added to those treating habeas corpus as a backdrop against which to
interpret the Suspension Clause. Furthermore, the conflict showed the
significance to members of the Founding generation of the personnel
applying law, whether military or civilian, rather than the substantive law
applied; this emphasis could also be significant for how we interpret
constitutional rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Ex parte Milligan made famous the notion that civilians should be tried
by ordinary courts when those remained open, even when hostilities were
ongoing. 1 There has been much discussion of this claim, from the perspective
of the Civil War context 2 as well as from the vantage point of original
meaning. 3 It has implications for a number of interpretive debates about the
inclusion—whether explicit or implicit—of emergency powers within the
U.S. Constitution and the meaning of the Suspension Clause. 4 This
Symposium Essay takes a basically unknown controversy in 1750s New
York as a window into the complexity of the relationship between habeas
corpus and martial law in the colonial context as well as the divergent visions
of common law already emerging between British imperial forces and local
American interpreters. 5 Through demonstrating the contested quality of
common law both independently and as modified by English statutes within
the British settler empire of eighteenth-century North America, this episode
highlights the significance of the imperial setting for understanding the
original meaning of the Constitution.

1

71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).
Milligan has alternately been viewed as a “bulwark[] of American liberty” and a political decision
by Justice David Davis to undermine a use of military courts that was perceived as crucial for attaining
the goals of Reconstruction. Martin S. Lederman, The Law(?) of the Lincoln Assassination, 118 COLUM.
L. REV. 323, 443 (2018). For the purposes of this Essay, the petitioner’s claim that the source of the
claimed presidential authority would rest in “the assumed power to declare what is called martial law”
furnishes a crucial connection between the writ of habeas corpus and the scope of martial law. Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 35.
3 See Andrew Kent, The New Originalism and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 757, 762–63 (2013) (citing Milligan in treating the questions that originalism should be able to
answer).
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
5 I have found a couple of references to the dispute in passing, but no full account based upon Yates’s
notes as well as Loudoun’s treatment and nothing that considers the stakes of the controversy in terms of
its implications for constitutional meaning. The most thorough discussion of Yates’s interactions with
Loudoun occurs in RUSSELL SHORTO, REVOLUTION SONG: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING IN SIX
REMARKABLE LIVES 112–18 (2018).
2
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In the late 1750s, Abraham Yates, who later became renowned as an
Antifederalist, was serving as a sheriff in upstate New York. 6 He was
appointed by Acting Governor James De Lancey and seemed to be holding
office without particular controversy until the 1756 arrival of John Campbell,
the Scottish fourth earl of Loudoun, as commander of the British forces in
America. 7 Lord Loudoun (John Campbell)—who had enjoyed an extensive
military career in Flanders as well as parts of Britain 8—was viewed as a less
than successful leader. 9 He was, nevertheless, appointed to coordinate efforts
in America against the French and the Indians during the Seven Years War. 10
Loudoun’s prolific correspondence upon arriving in America demonstrates
the skepticism with which he was met in many quarters and his varying
efforts to overcome the reservations of people and legislatures in several
colonies. 11
In 1757, Loudoun’s forces took up residence in Albany, where Yates
was serving. Conflict quickly ensued when Loudoun’s troops broke into the
jail, over which Yates presided, to imprison a local farmer accused of
harassing members of the military. 12 Yates refused to relinquish the keys to
6 Id. at 110–11, 416–39. See generally STEFAN BIELINSKI, ABRAHAM YATES, JR. AND THE NEW
POLITICAL ORDER IN REVOLUTIONARY NEW YORK (1975) (treating the story of Yates and his role during
and after the American Revolution).
7 SHORTO, supra note 5, at 110–12.
8 STANLEY MCCRORY PARGELLIS, LORD LOUDOUN IN NORTH AMERICA 42–43 (1933).
9 Philip Yorke, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, later “recall[ed] what was said of Loudoun at his
appointment, that he ‘might be a very good Colonel, but was absolutely unfit for chief command.’” Id. at
338.
10 Id. at 42–43.
11 Id. at 167–210 (recounting Loudoun’s difficulties with local assemblies and in quartering soldiers).
One particularly challenging aspect of the military situation preexisting Loudoun pertained to the
composition of the troops. Before Loudoun was chosen, British officials had debated what kind of armed
force to implement in America and, in particular, the proportion of officers and troops to be imported
from Britain as opposed to raised in America. Id. at 28–31, 41–42. When Loudoun arrived, a provincial
army composed of forces from both New England and New York was operating under the authority of
commissions granted to General John Winslow by the Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York
governors. Id. at 83. The separation of this body from coexisting British regiments carried significant
legal importance. In 1754, the Mutiny Act, which governed military discipline, had been amended, in
response to events in East India, to extend British military law to provincial troops serving alongside
British ones. Id. at 85–86, n.5; see An Act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion of Officers and Soldiers
in the Service of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies; and for the
Punishment of Offences Committed in the East-Indies, or at the Island of Saint Helena, (1754) § 9, 7 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE FROM MAGNA CHARTA, TO THE END OF THE LAST PARLIAMENT, 1761, at 549. The
martial law punishments specified by the Mutiny Act would have far exceeded the severity of the common
law. See PARGELLIS, supra note 8, at 86. This Symposium Essay focuses more on civilians’ status with
regard to military jurisdiction than gradations of authority over the military, but the differentiation among
even military personnel with respect to the law enforced is highly relevant. In both contexts, the question
of what substantive legal principles and remedies applied to those accused of wrongdoing was bound up
with the extent of authority of a commanding officer and his commission.
12 See infra notes 104–106 and accompanying text.
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the jail and got the courts in New York City to issue a writ of habeas corpus,
at which point he sent the accused there to be heard. 13 These acts of resistance
ignited a firestorm. They incurred the immediate wrath of Lord Loudoun,
who contended that his authority superseded the force of civilian law,
claiming that he had frequently heard British Lord Chancellor Hardwicke
declare that, when a military occupation proved necessary, military power
trumped civilian control. 14 On the other side, and in subsequent
correspondence with Governor De Lancey and others, Yates adduced a string
of authorities from English law to support the notion that habeas corpus
could not be suspended under these circumstances. 15
This conflict is a particularly fruitful one to study in order to gain access
to the disparate perspectives of civil and military officers, and British and
colonial personnel. Yates himself kept a detailed journal/copybook from
1754 to 1758, 16 and Lord Loudoun’s stint in America yielded more than one
hundred boxes of materials, including memorandum books and many
letters. 17 The temporal scope of the New York Public Library’s Yates
collection makes it possible to follow the ideas generated during the 1750s
through Yates’s stance in the period of constitutional formation.
The episode detailed here represents the crystallization of a conflict
over martial law and its status within colonial jurisdictions. It emerged from
a largely forgotten moment in the genealogy of martial law. Writing in the
aftermath of the American Civil War, Francis Lieber and his son, Norman
Lieber, penned a treatise on martial law that was only recently rediscovered
and has now been edited by Professors John Witt and Will Smiley. 18 The
Liebers’ work articulates a normative vision of martial law while also
surveying the relevant British and American history. The sequence of the
book, however, omits the period treated in this Symposium Essay. Instead,
the Liebers move from considering the role of martial law in domestic
English contexts to the British colonial implementation of martial law in the
late eighteenth century but neglect the formative period of the middle of the
eighteenth century. By neglecting the formative mid-eighteenth-century
period, the Liebers and other nineteenth-century commentators set the stage
for later scholarship, leading to the view common today that, “[p]rior to
13

See infra notes 108–110 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 116–124 and accompanying text.
16 Abraham Yates, Jr., Journals/Copybook 1754–1758 (Abraham Yates, Jr. Papers, Box 4,
Manuscripts and Archives Division, N.Y. Pub. Library).
17 John Campbell (Loudoun Papers: Americana, Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San
Marino, CA).
18 FRANCIS LIEBER & G. NORMAN LIEBER, TO SAVE THE COUNTRY: A LOST TREATISE ON MARTIAL
LAW (Will Smiley & John Fabian Witt eds., forthcoming July 2019).
14
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1815, America followed the traditional English common-law conception of
military authority, wherein ‘military jurisdiction extended only to members
of the armed forces.’” 19
Disregarding this earlier moment when martial law was already a point
of contention has implications for constitutional interpretation, particularly
of the Suspension Clause. Professor Amanda Tyler’s book Habeas Corpus
in Wartime: From the Tower of London to Guantanamo Bay, which has
become the standard text on the Anglo-American heritage of habeas corpus,
only treats martial law in the period following the Civil War. 20 Her account
of the English and American experiences in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries instead focuses on the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and similar later
laws on both sides of the Atlantic. 21 Professor Tyler’s framing of the issue at
once demonstrates the importance of English statutes as well as common law
to the formulation of constitutional principles and also suggests the relevance
of laws pertaining specifically to habeas corpus. Yet the laws which
furnished frameworks for martial law, including the Mutiny Act of 1689 and
its successors, 22 as well as various Militia Acts, should, in conjunction with
the aspects of martial law derived from prerogative powers, also be
considered part of the background of the Suspension Clause. 23
One argument for cordoning off the Suspension Clause from the martial
law context is textual: the Clause explicitly speaks of habeas corpus and
never mentions martial law. At the same time, however, the language of
rebellion or invasion echoes that of the Mutiny Act and Militia Acts, which
indicates that perhaps they should be considered in conjunction with each
other. Another argument for putting martial law to one side when interpreting
the Suspension Clause derives from the sense that martial law was not of
particular significance in the eighteenth century outside of England and
therefore would not have furnished a material component of the original
meaning of the Constitution. It is the latter claim that the remainder of this
Essay aims to refute.
The episode discussed below suggests several modifications of extant
originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation. First, it raises
questions about the scope of the common law backdrop informing originalist

19 Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field Theory: Martial Law, The Suspension Power, and the Insurrection
Act, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 391, 422 n.220 (2007) (quoting George M. Dennison, Martial Law: The
Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776–1861, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 52, 55 (1974)).
20 AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF LONDON TO
GUANTANAMO BAY 182–83, 211 (2017).
21 See id.; see also Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2.
22 See infra note 47.
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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interpretation, and, in particular, how broadly or narrowly to construe the
relevant legal contexts. Second, it undermines the distinctions that
originalists at times draw between common law and statutory frameworks as
well as their relevance to constitutional interpretation.24 Third, it suggests the
existence of a distinction between British imperial common law and the
interpretation of the common law by colonial subjects in America within the
mid-seventeenth century.
Part I of this Symposium Essay furnishes a brief overview of the
trajectory of debates about martial law from seventeenth-century England
through nineteenth-century Britain and America. Part II details the unfolding
of the controversy over the scope of martial law between Yates and Loudoun
as well as others on the colonial scene and explores some of the arguments
used by the various sides. In conclusion, this Essay furnishes an account of
how this controversy should affect our assessment of the original meaning
of constitutional provisions, especially in terms of the contrast between
British imperial practices and domestic American understandings of rights.
I.

FRAMING EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY MARTIAL LAW

Martial law has been notoriously difficult to define within England, the
British Empire, and countries that, like the United States, at some point freed
themselves from British dominion—in other words, the range of nations that
inherited the common law. The corresponding principle within civil law
countries is the état de siège, or “state of siege,” which originated during the
French Revolution and involves the temporary replacement of civil by
military authority. 25 Whereas the state of siege “is emphatically a legal
institution, expressly authorized by the constitutions . . . and organized under
this authority by a specific statute,” martial law draws on a murkier

24 This distinction occurs most prominently in the Confrontation Clause context, where Justice
Antonin Scalia’s distinction between common law and statutes in derogation of the common law shaped
understanding of the original meaning of confrontation. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36 (2004) (construing the Marian statutes of bail and committal narrowly in interpreting the Fourth
Amendment because these laws were viewed as in derogation of the common law); see also Bernadette
Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 563–65 (2006).
25 See Max Radin, Martial Law and the State of Siege, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 634, 637–38 (1942); see
also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 4–5 (Kevin Attell trans., 2005) (2003); WILLIAM E.
BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 302 (1892) (“The state of siege corresponds
to martial law in England and the United States. There is, however, this important distinction: what
lawfully may be done under a state of siege is fixed by statute, while martial law—subject to individual
responsibility for its enforcement, as before mentioned—is a rule unto itself.”). See generally THÉODORE
REINACH, DE L’ÉTAT DE SIÈGE ET DES INSTITUTIONS DE SALUT PUBLIC À ROME, EN FRANCE ET DANS
LES LÉGISLATIONS ÉTRANGÈRES (1885) (furnishing an account of the historical and conceptual genesis
of the state of siege).
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combination of legal sources and has been seen by some as simply permitting
the abrogation of law in its entirety. 26
Before the mid-nineteenth century, common law precepts were often
disregarded in governing the army, in certain exercises of prerogative power,
and in times of crisis—especially within colonial contexts.27 Yet it was only
at that moment that commentators coalesced around the designation “martial
law” and attempted to define the phrase more rigorously. Prior to that point,
scattered remarks abound but legal and political actors did not consistently
refer to martial law. The comprehensive treatises on the subject date from
that time or later, which presents a historiographical problem. A crucial
question that emerges is whether martial law in the way that these authors
envisioned it even existed prior to the nineteenth century. 28 Likewise, their
accounts of the history of martial law are inevitably shaped by the contexts
in which they themselves were writing, whether that of the American Civil
War and Reconstruction, the Morant Bay uprising and suppression in
Jamaica, or American expansion beyond the territorial United States in the
late nineteenth century.
The distinction between military law, or the law governing members of
the armed forces, and martial law proper, which involved the imposition of
some form of emergency rule, became crucial during the nineteenth century
and represented perhaps the most widespread aspect of the definition of
martial law. 29 However, as Professor John Collins has explained, this line
was not drawn earlier.30 It is important, therefore, to place this differentiation
to one side in considering the eighteenth-century context, as this lens could
obscure the lines that contemporary actors were actually drawing. With that
in mind, this Part surveys the debates about martial law in England, the
British Empire, and America prior to the late nineteenth century.
Professor Collins’s book Martial Law and English Laws, c. 1500–c.
1700 furnishes a comprehensive account of the early history of martial law
in England, a history that he finds much less murky than prior commentators.
26 Radin, supra note 25, at 637. The petitioner’s argument in Milligan, asserting that “[w]hat is
ordinarily called martial law is no law at all,” echoes this sentiment. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall)
2, 36 (1866).
27 See infra notes 31–60 and accompanying text.
28 In the context of human rights, Professor Samuel Moyn has, for example, warned us not to delve
too far back into history for genealogies of ideas that may have relatively recent origins. SAMUEL MOYN,
THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2012).
29 JOHN M. COLLINS, MARTIAL LAW AND ENGLISH LAWS, C. 1500–C. 1700, at 5 (2016); R.W.
KOSTAL, A JURISPRUDENCE OF POWER: VICTORIAN EMPIRE AND THE RULE OF LAW 221–37 (2005)
(describing the use of the distinction in the context of the Jamaica Royal Committee’s inquiries as well
as in William Francis Finlason’s 1866 work, A Treatise on Martial Law).
30 COLLINS, supra note 29, at 5.
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He explains the key differences between martial and common law procedure,
particularly that the former “was allowed to operate by more informal
plaints, complaints, or informations, and not by indictments.” 31 This aspect
of martial law rendered it appealing to the Tudor monarchs, who used martial
law to discipline soldiers and “to punish commoners who had risen against
them.” 32 In the late sixteenth century, summary martial law commissions,
“which allowed sheriffs, constables, mayors, loyal peers, provost marshals,
and seneschals to execute vagrants, suspected felons of ill name, and traitors
upon sight,” became widely used in Ireland. 33 Although broadly criticized,
“[i]deas surrounding summary martial law circulated between England and
Ireland, transforming martial law practices in both kingdoms in the
process.” 34 In this and subsequent instances, developments in martial law
took place within the context of England’s expanding empire.
Diverging from the approach under Roman law, which had removed
jurisdiction over soldiers from civilian courts, England permitted some
common law jurisdiction over members of the military. 35 Beginning in the
sixteenth century, however, the monarchy cabined the authority of local
magistrates over soldiers in garrison towns; although common law judges
could adjudicate felony cases against soldiers, they could only hear
misdemeanor cases if they received permission from the suspect’s
commanding officer. 36 In the seventeenth century, local officials grew
increasingly frustrated with their inability to control soldiers. The response
of the Privy Council under King Charles I was to furnish mayors, deputy
lieutenants, and other civilians with the power to implement martial law,
while continuing to obstruct the efforts of officers of the common law, such
as justices of the peace, to punish soldiers.37 These issues of local governance
underlay objections to martial law jurisdiction in the 1620s.
When Parliament took up the question of martial law in 1628, an
engagement that left its record in the Petition of Right, the nature of the
discussion did not reflect these jurisdictional questions. 38 Instead, “the focus
of the debate swayed from the real problems that soldiers presented to county
officers and the jurisdictional politics the jurists wanted to pursue.” 39 Both
31

Id. at 33.
Id. at 43.
33 Id. at 53.
34 Id. at 86.
35 Id. at 150.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 138. See generally Lindsay Boynton, Martial Law and the Petition of Right, 79 ENG. HIST.
REV. 255 (1964) (examining the use of martial law during the early years of King Charles I’s reign).
38 COLLINS, supra note 29, at 156.
39 Id.
32
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Sir Edward Coke and Sir John Selden, two of the foremost jurists of the
seventeenth century, weighed in with arguments against martial law.40
The Petition of Right, presented to the ill-fated King Charles in 1628,
expressed outrage against the Crown for encouraging procedures deviating
from common law conceptions of due process. Several sections specifically
took aim against martial law, objecting that “certain Persons have been
assigned and appointed Commissioners with Power and Authority to proceed
within the Land, according to the Justice of Martial Law, against such
Soldiers or Mariners” who committed crimes ranging from misdemeanors to
felony and murder and, in doing so, could employ the summary proceedings
of martial law and put those condemned to death. 41 However, even while
expressing concern over the harshness of martial law, the Petition also
lamented that “sundry grievous Offenders” had escaped punishment because
of the claim that they could only be tried under martial law and not through
the ordinary processes of common law. 42
The imposition of martial law was not the Petition of Right’s sole
concern. It also took up, among other items, the inefficacy of writs of habeas
corpus against royal detentions. As Section V recriminates King Charles:
[D]ivers of your Subjects have of late been imprisoned without any Cause
shewed; and when for their Deliverance they were brought before your Justices
by Your Majesty’s Writs of Habeas Corpus, there to undergo and receive as the
Court should order, and their Keepers commanded to certify the Causes of their
Detainer, no Cause was certified, but that they were detained by Your Majesty’s
special Command, signified by the Lords of your Privy Council, and yet were
returned back to several Prisons, without being charged with any Thing to
which they might make Answer according to the Law. 43

Although the bodies were brought to court, they were not released and
continued to be held based on secret justifications. Here we see the
concomitance of concerns about martial law with worries about the
inefficacy of habeas corpus.
As commonly interpreted, the Petition of Right, after it was agreed to
by a reluctant King, barred martial law within England in times of peace. Sir
Matthew Hale discusses the effect of the Petition briefly in his The History
of the Common Law of England, which considers martial law among several
alternatives to common law. As Hale explains, “the Exercise of Martial Law,
whereby any Person should lose his Life or Member, or Liberty, may not be
40
41
42
43

Id. at 154–63.
Petition of Right 1628, 3 Car. 1, § 7.
Id. § 9.
Id. § 5.
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permitted in Time of Peace, when the King’s Courts are open for all Persons
to receive Justice, according to the Laws of the Land. This is in Substance
declared by the Petition of Right . . . .” 44
During the Restoration and the later part of the seventeenth century,
martial law flourished within England’s colonial dominions despite the
Petition of Right, even when war was not taking place. The 1683 charter of
the East India Company permitted the Company to “[e]xecute and use,
within the said Plantations, Forts and Places, the Law, called the Martial
Law, for the Defence of the said Forts, Places and Plantations, against any
foreign Invasion, or domestic Insurrection or Rebellion . . . .” 45 Colonial
governors, deriving their power from the King’s prerogative, often had the
authority to impose martial law, although debates about subjecting civilians
to its jurisdiction even outside of England continued. 46
It was only after 1689, however, that martial law increased its influence
both within England itself and throughout the empire. The crucial legal
measure was the Mutiny Act of 1689, which permitted the deployment of
martial law with regard to soldiers. 47 This law was passed the same year as
the first statutory suspension of habeas and only ten years after passage of
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which is frequently viewed as a foundational
measure for the Anglo-American understanding of habeas corpus. 48 Debate
raged over whether the Mutiny Act had actually suspended the Petition of
Right and permitted the use of martial law even outside of wartime. Professor
Collins convincingly demonstrates that it did, arguing that “parliament
suspended the Petition of Right for soldiers in the same way that it
occasionally suspended Habeas Corpus for plotters.” 49 Within the eighteenth
century, as Professor Collins explains, “[t]he Mutiny Act went global” and,
“[f]rom England to Minorca to Gibraltar and eventually to North America,
British soldiers were disciplined through the successive passages of the
statute,” while colonies also enacted their own versions of the law.50 At the

44

SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 39–40 (3d ed. 1739).
CHARTERS GRANTED TO THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY, FROM 1601, at 121 (1773) (quoted in
COLLINS, supra note 29, at 217).
46 COLLINS, supra note 29, at 207–47.
47 Act for punishing Officers and Soldiers who shall mutiny or desert their Majesties Service, to
continue till November 1689, and no longer, (1689) § 5, 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE FROM MAGNA
CHARTA, TO THE END OF THE LAST PARLIAMENT, 1761, at 416.
48 For extensive discussion of this and succeeding suspensions, see PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS
CORPUS FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE, 247–52 (2010); see also Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2.
49 COLLINS, supra note 29, at 249. For further discussion, see CHARLES M. CLODE, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER MILITARY AND MARTIAL LAW 19–21 (2d ed. rev. 1874).
50 COLLINS, supra note 29, at 281–82.
45
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same time, prerogative-based versions of martial law coexisted with
statutory varieties. 51
The Mutiny Act was not the only statute to furnish a framework for
martial law. Professor Collins points to the Riot Act of 1715 52 and its
successors. 53 Another law that became increasingly important during the
eighteenth century was the Militia Act of 1661 and its subsequent revisions.
The title of the first Militia Act affirmed royal power over the militia, reading
in full, “An Act declaring the sole Right of the Militia to be in King and for
the present ordering & disposing the same.” The act also indemnified all who
had, commissioned by the King, “assaulted arrested detained or imprisoned”
anyone who was “suspected to be Fanatick Sectary or Disturber of the
Peace . . . .” 54 Almost a century later, the Militia Act of 1757 allowed for the
selection by lottery of a substantial number of men for armed service and
also provided that “in case of actual Invasion, or upon imminent Danger
thereof, or in case of Rebellion,” the King could—with notice to Parliament,
if it were sitting—draw out the militias, who would thereby become subject
to military discipline for the duration of their service.55
Notwithstanding these legal frameworks, some commentators
articulated the view that martial law was simply not law. As Sir Matthew
Hale explained, “in Truth and Reality it is not a Law, but something indulged
rather than allowed as a Law; the necessity of Government, Order, and
Discipline in an Army, is that only which can give those Laws a
Countenance . . . .” 56 Sir William Blackstone took a similar position in the
eighteenth century, citing Hale and claiming that martial law “is built upon
no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in [its] decisions . . . .” 57 Others
emphasized the subordination of military to civilian authority within
England. Swiss-English jurist J.L. De Lolme, read by members of the
Founding generation in America, foregrounded this point in his 1771 work
Constitution de l’Angleterre. There he cited the Petition of Right and

51

Id. at 275.
The Riot Act (1715) § 5, 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE FROM MAGNA CHARTA, TO THE END OF THE
LAST PARLIAMENT, 1761, at 8.
53 COLLINS, supra note 29, at 272–73.
54 An Act declaring the sole Right of the Militia to be in King and for the present ordering &
disposing the same (1661) § 6, 5 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 308.
55 An Act for the better ordering of the Militia Forces in the several Counties of that Part of Great
Britain called England (1757) § 25, 8 THE STATUTES AT LARGE FROM MAGNA CHARTA, TO THE END OF
THE LAST PARLIAMENT, 1761, at 80.
56 HALE, supra note 44, at 39.
57 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 438 (12th ed. rev. 1794).
52
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highlighted placement of the military under civilian authority within
England, exaggerating the stability of this arrangement. 58
Despite the continued development of martial law within the British
imperial context throughout the eighteenth century, the historiography on
this subject is limited and somewhat dated, focusing primarily on the
imposition of martial law during the American Revolution. 59 The most
comprehensive work remains Frederick Bernays Wiener’s 1967 Civilians
Under Military Justice: The British Practice Since 1689 Especially in North
America. 60 This scholarly gap is especially significant because it leaves the
impression that the British imperial deployment of martial law gathered
steam primarily in the nineteenth century when treatises on the subject
burgeoned. In practice, however, theories and critiques of martial law were
already circulating across colonial contexts, as illustrated by the episode
described in Part II. Furthermore, emergence of greater awareness of the
dynamics of imperial constitutionalism largely postdates the existing work,
which displays little interest in the imperial context informing the
development of martial law. 61
One exception is Professor Daniel Hulsebosch’s treatment of the only
eighteenth-century treatise pertaining to martial law, Stephen Payne Adye’s
1769 A Treatise on Courts Martial. 62 Adye’s work is particularly important
because its claims run counter to those of Coke, Hale, and Blackstone. He
discounts Coke and Hale’s statements that someone imposing martial law
during peacetime could be prosecuted for murder, citing to the Mutiny Act
58 J.L. DE LOLME, CONSTITUTION DE L’ANGLETERRE 202–27 (1771); see also J.L. DE LOLME, THE
CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 447–51, 486 (rev. 1796) (consulted for its English translation).
59 See, e.g., DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830, at 157–69 (2005)
(discussing the effects of martial law’s migration across the Atlantic on New York); David E. Engdahl,
Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 16–28 (1971) (briefly rehearsing the English and American experience in the eighteenth century
and suggesting a widespread condemnation of martial law). See generally Arthur N. Gilbert, British
Military Justice During the American Revolution, 20 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 24 (1979) (focusing
primarily on courts martial during the American Revolution); Arthur N. Gilbert, Military and Civilian
Justice in Eighteenth-Century England: An Assessment, 17 J. BRIT. STUD. 41 (1978) (comparing crimes
and procedures between military and civilian tribunals).
60 FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE: THE BRITISH PRACTICE
SINCE 1689 ESPECIALLY IN NORTH AMERICA 32–85 (1967) (treating the use of military justice against
civilians during the Seven Years War following through 1775). Surprisingly, the book has only three
mentions of Loudoun and none of Yates. Id.
61 For sources treating the constitution of empire, see generally LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR
SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400–1900 (2010); LEGAL PLURALISM
AND EMPIRES, 1500–1850 (Lauren Benton & Richard J. Ross eds., 2013); and HULSEBOSCH, supra note
59.
62 HULSEBOSCH, supra note 59, at 164–65; see also STEPHEN PAYNE ADYE, A TREATISE ON COURTS
MARTIAL 1, 5–6 (1769).
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as well as the opinion of Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown—which he
emphasizes postdated Coke and Hale. 63 As Professor Hulsebosch notes,
Adye, who was himself a member of the British army and served as a judge
advocate in America, emphasizes the continuity between common and
martial law, noting, among other aspects, that courts martial involve trial by
jury. 64 While treating martial law as largely a creature of statutory rather than
common law, Adye at the same time suggests that the statutory procedures
should be supplemented by common law. As he writes:
Though Courts Martial proceed by Virtue of a Statute, which like all others was
made to supply the defects of the common law, which had no authority to take
cognizance of the crimes therein mentioned, yet as the method of proceeding
against criminals had been long established, the Act for punishing Officers and
Soldiers by Martial law has only laid down such rules for the proceedings of
Courts Martial, as were intended to differ from the usual methods in the
ordinary Courts of law; it is therefore natural to suppose that where the Act is
silent, it should be understood that the manner of proceeding at Courts Martial
be regulated by that of the other established Courts of Judicature. 65

Adye then proceeds to draw upon common law criminal procedure and
substantive doctrines to flesh out the mechanisms for holding courts martial.
Although the beginning of Adye’s text touches on other aspects of
martial law, he largely focuses on judicial proceedings and courts martial.
An early and suggestive footnote remarks on the deployment of courts
martial for all cases in colonial outposts like Gibraltar and Minorca where
civil judicature was not established. 66 On the same page, Adye cites Hale and
unnamed additional authorities for the proposition that, although “[t]he
Articles of War mention only Officers, Soldiers, and Persons serving with
the Armies in the Field, being Subject to Martial Law . . . [a]liens, who in a
hostile Manner invade the Kingdom . . . must be dealt with by Martial
Law.” 67 These are, however, the only remarks that touch upon the scope of
martial law jurisdiction, and dilemmas involving detention short of trial do
not arise during the course of the treatise.
The nineteenth century witnessed the expansion of martial law within
the British imperial context before, as Professor Thomas Poole has put it,
63 ADYE, supra note 62, at 5 (“[Hawkins] is of the opinion that ‘where Persons act by Virtue of a
Commission, which, if it were strictly regular, would undoubtedly give them full Authority, but happens
to be defective only in some Point of Form, that they are no Way criminal.’”) (quoting WILLIAM
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN bk. 1 at 1, 86 (1716)).
64 Id. at 18–19; HULSEBOSCH, supra note 59, at 165; see also WIENER, supra note 60, at 182–88
(treating Adye).
65 ADYE, supra note 62, at 34–35.
66 Id. at 7 n.†.
67 Id. at 7.
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“[the] Great War had brought martial law home” to England itself. 68
Concomitantly, martial law emerged as a subject of crucial importance
during the American Civil War and Reconstruction. Although these periods
postdate the controversy that forms the subject of Part II, a brief survey helps
demonstrate how nineteenth-century treatise writers received the prior
history of martial law, how their accounts emerged out of particular historical
conflicts and crystallized positions useful to one side or the other in these
struggles, and how those reflecting on martial law eventually came to define
it.
R.W. Kostal’s magisterial work A Jurisprudence of Power illustrates
nineteenth-century British imperial developments through its comprehensive
account of the Morant Bay uprising in 1865 Jamaica and its aftermath,
including the imposition of martial law, the atrocities committed under it,
and the operations of the Jamaica Committee, a group that lobbied for
investigation of what took place in Jamaica. 69 One of the principal
nineteenth-century treatments of martial law, W.F. Finlason’s A Treatise on
Martial Law, explicitly responds to the circumstances in Jamaica, defending
both the deployment of martial law there and a broad immunity for those
who had implemented it. 70
Finlason embraces a broad view of martial law, insisting that common
law itself permits a response in cases of actual rebellion and invasion, and
that the utility of martial law consists in its capacity to deal more broadly
with situations of potential discord. As he insists, “It is the state of hostility
[] which leads to actual insurrection with which martial law deals, and with
which it deals, in order to prevent actual insurrection, by means of summary
severity of military rule.” 71 The crucial role of the imperial and colonial
context in this definition is revealed by looking at the footnote to this
sentence. It first highlights the language of the Irish Rebellion Act of 1798
and then turns to racist contemplation of what would happen in the colonies
if “the native population . . . are allowed to rise en masse” before concluding
that “the stern and summary severity of martial law” represents the only

68 THOMAS POOLE, REASON OF STATE: LAW, PREROGATIVE AND EMPIRE 206 (2015). The dynamic
here is similar to what Professor Binyamin Blum has described with respect to the imperial development
of the law of evidence. See generally Binyamin Blum, The Hounds of Empire: Forensic Dog Tracking in
Britain and Its Colonies, 1888–1953, 35 L. & HIST. REV. 621 (2017) (exploring colonialism’s role in
shaping modern forensic culture).
69 See generally KOSTAL, supra note 29.
70 W.F. FINLASON, A TREATISE ON MARTIAL LAW (1866).
71 Id. at 21.
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answer. 72 This is but one example; the specter of colonial unrest pervades the
entire treatise. 73
In this work, Finlason also restricts the scope of the Petition of Right to
England itself. He construes its protections narrowly within the territory of
England but also insists that,
as the Petition of Right does not extend to the foreign dominions of the Crown,
the exercise of the prerogative by Governors, representatives of the Crown in
colonies or dependencies where the English law prevails, is still less limited,
and fully exists as at common law, apart from any statutable law. 74

Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, the American Civil War occasioned its
own set of debates about martial law, which continued into Reconstruction.
One of the most important Supreme Court cases on the subject, Ex parte
Milligan, was decided in 1866, the same year Finlason’s treatise appeared.75
Lambdin Milligan, an Indiana resident who was involved with the Sons of
Liberty, a group of northern Confederate sympathizers, was arrested in 1864,
tried by a military commission, and sentenced to death. He brought a writ of
habeas corpus to challenge the legality of this proceeding, which the
Supreme Court granted despite an apparent suspension of the writ. In doing
so, the Court determined that a civilian could not be tried by military
commission in a state where the courts remained open and where active

72 FINLASON, supra note 70, at 21 n.(b). In Finlason’s Table of Authorities, he notes that the Irish
Rebellion Act, 43 Geo. III, c. 117, “expressly reserv[ed] the power of the Crown to declare martial law
in time of rebellion.” Id. at xlvi.
73 For example, Finlason’s argument for not holding officials legally responsible in the aftermath of
declarations of martial law relies in part on the notion that “it would be perilous to the defence of our
distant colonies and dependencies, in case of rebellion, if it were understood that Governors and Generals
who declared, and acted on, martial law, were to be deemed guilty of wholesale murder, and entirely
dependent on the indulgence of a bill of indemnity.” Id. at xxviii.
74 Id. at 46.
75 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Much ink has been spilled on the interpretation of Milligan as well as
its relation to other cases involving military tribunals and the suspension of habeas corpus, including Ex
parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (Taney, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md. 1861), and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1 (1942). See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror:
An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 387–89 (2010) (contrasting Milligan
and Quirin in discussion of Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)); Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten
Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 917, 995–96, 1004–17 (2012)
(considering Milligan and Quirin in the context of the history of the Suspension Clause). See generally
JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 311 (2012)
(explaining the significance of Milligan for the use of military commissions and martial law during
Reconstruction); Vladeck, supra note 19 (treating the typologies of military jurisdiction from Chief
Justice Salmon Chase’s separate opinion in Milligan in relation to his arguments about martial law’s
effect on the suspension of habeas corpus); John Yoo, Lincoln and Habeas: Or Merryman and Milligan
and McCardle, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 505 (2009) (discussing how Civil War-era habeas cases demonstrate
the deferential attitude of the Supreme Court to other branches of government during wartime).
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hostilities were not ongoing. 76 Justice Davis’s opinion for the majority
rejected the broad, Finlason view, deeming the threat of an invasion
insufficient to justify employment of martial law. 77 Even though “[t]he
necessities of the service, during the late Rebellion, required that the loyal
states should be placed within the limits of certain military districts and
commanders appointed in them,” this in and of itself did not “constitute[]
them the theatre of military operations.” 78
Although concurring in the judgment, Chief Justice Chase wrote
separately, along with three other Justices, and stated that Congress had the
power under the Constitution to set up military commissions as well as to
suspend habeas corpus, but had not done so in this instance. 79 Toward the
conclusion of his opinion, Chase proceeded to define martial law and
distinguish it from two concepts in the same family:
There are under the Constitution three kinds of military jurisdiction: one to be
exercised both in peace and war; another to be exercised in time of foreign war
without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion and civil war
within states or districts occupied by rebels treated as belligerents; and a third
to be exercised in time of invasion or insurrection within the limits of the
United States, or during rebellion within the limits of states maintaining
adhesion to the National Government, when the public danger requires its
exercise. The first of these may be called jurisdiction under military law . . . ;
the second may be distinguished as military government, superseding, as far as
may be deemed expedient, the local law, and exercised by the military
commander under the direction of the President, with the express or implied
sanction of Congress; while the third may be denominated martial law proper,
and is called into action by Congress, or temporarily, when the action of
Congress cannot be invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by
the President, in times of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war,
within districts or localities where ordinary law no longer adequately secures
public safety and private rights. 80

According to this interpretation, “martial law proper” takes over only in the
absence of the protections of ordinary law during times of war or rebellion.
On the other side, military law involves only regulation of the army both in
times of peace and those of war. Military government represents an
intriguing intermediate category, permitting a military commander to take
control over a territory.
76
77
78
79
80
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It was in response to the turmoil of the Civil War and the efforts of
Reconstruction that Francis Lieber, who penned the code that President
Lincoln used to guide the Union Army, and his son, Norman Lieber,
composed a treatise on martial law that has heretofore remained in
manuscript. 81 The Liebers’ treatise remarks on the relative recentness of what
they deem martial law proper, a condition of necessity in which the nation’s
natural right to collective self-defense allowed for the suspension of ordinary
law. 82 They date the emergence of this understanding to the Irish Rebellion
of 1798, thus cordoning off most of the eighteenth century. 83 They likewise
distinguish martial law not only from military law but also from military or
martial rule, writing that whereas martial law covers a country’s own citizens
and subjects, 84 martial rule pertains to foreign enemies or occupations.85
Nevertheless, they admit some limited cases between domestic and foreign
exercises of martial law, particularly with respect to civil war, when a
country splits into two groups of citizens. 86
Under the Liebers’ account, martial law derived its authority from
prerogative powers as well as statutes. Martial law as they conceived it did
not, they believed, violate the Constitution. Instead, the Liebers read a
background principle of necessity into the Constitution, insisting that “the
Constitution, in some of its provisions, recognizes the law of necessity as
qualifying those of otherwise general application.” 87
They also resurrected an earlier, multifaceted definition of martial law
from the 1863 “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field,” a code that Francis Lieber composed, which did not

81 Professor John Witt revealed Lieber’s extraordinary role in creating this code and its importance
in establishing a law of war in LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2012).
WITT, supra note 75. Professor Witt and Professor Will Smiley have edited the Liebers’ treatise in a
forthcoming book. See LIEBER & LIEBER, supra note 18. All citations are taken with permission from
their edition.
82 Professors Smiley and Witt discuss the Liebers’ justifying principle comprehensively in their
Introduction. LIEBER & LIEBER, supra note 18, at 34–35.
83 Id. at 175.
84 Id. at 90 (“Martial Rule, or Military Government, relates to the occupied territory of an enemy;
Martial Law Proper, strictly speaking, to the inhabitants of a district, belonging, and maintaining
allegiance to, the country by whose military authority it is enforced.”).
85 Id. at 98 (“Martial Law Proper then is an enforcement by a country of the law of war with reference
to its own subjects. It is the law of necessity applied at home in a time of war. It is an exercise of military
authority, over persons, property, or rights, not ordinarily subject to such jurisdiction. It for the time being
suspends the administration of the ordinary law whenever, and in so far as, it is necessary to the national
defence. And it extends to all parts of the country, not treated as belligerent, (to which the martial law of
hostile occupation would apply) where such necessity exists.”).
86 Id. at 90.
87 Id. at 94.
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explicitly cover the case of domestic imposition of martial law. The
“Instructions” specified:
1. A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in consequence
of the occupation, under the Martial Law of the invading or occupying
army . . . .
2. Martial Law does not cease during the hostile occupation, except by
special proclamation, ordered by the commander-in-chief . . . .
3. Martial Law in a hostile country consists in the suspension, by the
occupying military authority, of the criminal and civil law, and of the domestic
administration and government in the occupied place or territory, and in the
substitution of military rule and force for the same, as well as in the dictation of
general laws, as far as military necessity requires this suspension, substitution
or dictation.
The commander of the forces may proclaim that the administration of all
civil and penal law shall continue, either wholly or in part, as in times of peace,
unless otherwise ordered by the military authority.
4. Martial Law is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the
laws and usages of war. . . .
5. Martial Law should be less stringent in places and countries fully occupied
and fairly conquered. Much greater severity may be exercised in places or
regions where actual hostilities exist, or are expected and must be prepared for.
Its most complete sway is allowed—even in the commander’s own country—
when face to face with the enemy, because of the absolute necessities of the
case, and of the paramount duty to defend the country against invasion. 88

Several aspects of the “Instructions” are noteworthy here. First, they specify
that military commanders could permit the continued administration of civil
laws. Second, they differentiate between the kind of martial law that should
be applied in “places and countries fully occupied and fairly conquered” and
that appropriate for “places or regions where actual hostilities exist.” Both
of these distinctions are pertinent to colonial settings as well as to civil war.
Finally, William Birkhimer, who had served in the Union Army,
became a general, and also acted in a judicial capacity within the army,
composed the treatise Military Government and Martial Law, first published
in 1892. 89 The text went through several editions; the 1914 version reflects
Birkhimer’s experience with American expansion in the Philippines—where

88
89
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he had been an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines—
as well as in Cuba and Puerto Rico, and internal conflict with the Shoshone. 90
Birkhimer is greatly indebted to Lieber, whose manuscript treatise he
cites, and he adopts Lieber’s view of martial law as justified only by
necessity. 91 He also invokes a proportionality principle, explaining that
“neither enemy property nor life shall be sacrificed unless thereby the
military interests of the belligerent are proportionately subserved.” 92 It is
worth dwelling on several aspects of Birkhimer’s account of martial law,
particularly his insistence on military over civil authority, his defense of
Congress’s capacity to institute martial law, and his conception of martial
law as not entirely distinct from but instead an outgrowth of common law.
More than some other commentators, and perhaps partly because of his
own military background and identity, Birkhimer emphasizes that military
authorities assume command over civilian ones under martial law. Hence,
although civil institutions may be retained, they operate under military
control:
All military is in one sense martial rule, for in its essence it is the law of
arms. Still, because of the unusual relation of the military to the civil power,
when for the time being in friendly territory the latter gives way to the sway of
the former, it is necessary to have some term by which military rule under these
circumstances shall be designated, and that selected is martial law. This law is
invoked as an extreme measure which pressing necessity alone can justify.
It is not asserted that both martial law and the municipal law sub modo may
not be enforced over the same territory at the same time; for where martial law
is instituted by legislative act there is nothing to prevent the civil administration
from being retained, although the military is made predominant, the limits of
each being defined. Similarly the executive officer who enforces martial law
may bring the civil power to his assistance. The effect, however, of martial law

90 As the Preface to the Second (Revised) Edition reads, “Since this work was published (1892) the
military authorities of the United States, and those of Great Britain, have had occasion to inaugurate and
enforce military government on an extensive scale and under varied circumstances. The first mentioned
did this in Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands; the last mentioned in the South African
republics . . . . During the twelve years last past there have been several conspicuous instances of
enforcing martial law within the United States. In Idaho, in 1899, the Governor declared Shoshone County
to be in a state of insurrection and rebellion, and instituted martial law therein.” WILLIAM E. BIRKHIMER,
MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW, at vii (Franklin Hudson Pub. Co. 3d ed. rev. 1914) (1892).
For biographical details about Birkhimer, see generally William Edward Birkhimer, ARLINGTON
CEMETERY, http://arlingtoncemetery.net/wbirkhim.htm [https://perma.cc/D3VA-MEFP].
91 BIRKHIMER, supra note 25, at 300–01.
92 Id. at 9.
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is either to supersede the municipal law wholly or the latter is retained
subordinate to the former. 93

According to Birkhimer’s conception, two options are possible: either the
military assumes complete control over the territory in which martial law is
in force, or civil administration remains but is placed beneath the military
authority.
Birkhimer also furnishes a lengthy defense of Congress’s capacity to
implement martial law, attempting to refute the claim that “martial law
power is essentially executive in its nature.” 94 In doing so, he invokes the
War Powers Clause and cites to the precedent of statutes that Congress
passed, including congressional acts of indemnity following exercise of
martial law powers and the Reconstruction Acts of 1867. 95 Acknowledging
that some might see a congressional power to impose martial law as
incompatible with Justice Davis’s opinion in Ex parte Milligan, he refrains
from directly resolving the question but explains that the judicial consensus
has, at least, altered since the date of that case. 96
Despite affirming Congress’s authority to implement martial law,
Birkhimer refrains from cordoning martial law off from common law and
concomitantly suggests that Congress’s power is not absolute. As he writes,
“[m]artial law has its foundation in reason. It is but a development of the
principles of the common law,” which, due to its reliance on civil authority,
“is not suited to the more trying and turbulent times either of invasion or
rebellion.” 97 This gloss on martial law also leads him to emphasize that
martial law cannot suspend the operations of reason itself, particularly with
respect to indemnifying governmental actors from the consequences of
outrageous behavior. Hence he observes that “[i]t is contrary to reason and
every principle of justice that, under color of law, officers shall be permitted
to inflict punishment unrestrained, except as prompted by a depraved heart
and then escape responsibility.” 98 Under this account, a period of martial law
does not remain outside of legality; instead, actions taken during that time
can produce subsequent repercussions through the regular operations of the
common law.
Several important themes emerge from these treatments of martial law.
One involves the continuity or lack thereof between martial law and common
law, as well as the extent to which martial law should be seen as a product
93
94
95
96
97
98
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of statute or as derived from a combination of prerogative and statutory
powers. Whereas in Tudor England, martial law furnished a mechanism for
monarchs to circumvent common law, by the late seventeenth century,
statutes were both setting restrictions on and giving contours to martial law.
Statutes did not, however, entirely eclipse prerogative versions of martial
law, particularly in the colonial context, where disputes over the force of
English statutes were ongoing and colonial governors derived powers from
the Crown. In the late eighteenth through the nineteenth centuries, from
Stephen Payne Adye’s Treatise on Courts Martial through William
Birkhimer’s Military Government and Martial Law, some commentators
attempted to reconcile martial with common law. 99
Another commonality concerns the emerging distinction among the
objects of the exercise of military authority, whether a country’s own
citizens, enemies, or residents of an occupied territory. Both Chief Justice
Chase’s opinion in Milligan and Francis Lieber’s “Instructions”
distinguished the imposition of martial law within an occupied region from
other varieties of martial law.
A final issue involves the relative power of military and civilian
personnel under martial law. Not only were the substantive or procedural
issues raised by military tribunals in question, but also who was in charge of
determining the legal framework to be used—a military officer or civil
authority. Hence Birkhimer considers it possible that municipal legal
frameworks could remain intact under martial law but subject to the
supervision of military rather than civilian authorities.
While these themes could be found on the surface of nineteenth-century
discussions of martial law, some cognate concerns manifest themselves
within the eighteenth-century dispute in colonial New York that the
following Part treats.
II. “IN EVERY COUNTRY, THAT REQUIRES AN ARMY TO DEFEND IT”
The relative dearth of contemporaneous accounts of martial law within
the eighteenth century and subsequent treatises’ neglect of the period give
the impression that most significant contemplation of martial law postdates
the Founding Era. The mid-eighteenth-century dispute considered in this
Part not only calls that view into question but also indicates how assertions
of one form of martial law—that associated with occupation—had
implications for accessing the writ of habeas corpus.
The French and Indian War, which subsequently expanded into the
global Seven Years’ War, commenced in 1754. Both Britain and France sent
99

See ADYE, supra note 62; BIRKHIMER, supra note 25.
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military forces from the metropole to their colonies as part of the war, and
each allied with different indigenous constituencies. The experience of the
first British commander, General Edward Braddock, was disastrous, and he
died in 1755. 100 As the British contemplated the nature and extent of support
they would furnish to their American colonies, Lord Loudoun was chosen to
command the forces. 101 He arrived in America in 1756 and proceeded to
travel, negotiate, and fight extensively until he was summarily recalled after
only two years. 102 During his stint, he spent some time in Albany, along with
various troops of both local colonial and British origin. 103
On October 7, 1757, a number of soldiers escorted one Jacob Van Der
Werken into the Albany City Hall with their bayonets fixed upon him. 104 Van
Der Werken’s farm had been plagued by oxen who belonged to “the New
England people,” part of the military forces stationed locally, but he had not
been able to determine which ones. As a result, during one of the animals’
nocturnal visits, in a move reminiscent of the Decameron, he cut several of
their tails so that he could subsequently identify them and find their
owners. 105
Once at City Hall, the soldiers demanded that the sheriff, Abraham
Yates Junior, commit Van Der Werken to gaol. Yates refused, because the
soldiers could produce no warrant for Van Der Werken’s arrest—or, in
technical terms, a mittimus. Upon receiving this response, they consulted
with their leader, Captain Christy, who ordered them to break into the gaol
and imprison Van Der Werken regardless of the sheriff’s views.
Yates was not happy with this state of affairs and his papers indicate the
vigor with which he pursued measures designed to contravene the soldiers’
actions. He wrote immediately to the Acting Governor of New York, James
De Lancey, articulating his view that it would be the “Intire Ruin of a
Sheriff” not to keep his prisoner safe and that the “freedom” and “Liberty of
the People In General” depends upon the capacity to retain control over
prisoners. In later correspondence and memoranda, Yates elaborated upon
his duty to maintain prisoners safely and mentioned having been fined fifty100

PARGELLIS, supra note 8, at 30–39.
Id. at 42.
102 Id. at 346.
103 Id. at 90.
104 The description of this incident is derived, when not noted otherwise, from Abraham Yates’s
Journals/Copybook 1754–1758 in the Manuscripts and Archives Division of the New York Public
Library, supra note 16.
105 In the second story of the third day of the Decameron, the King attempts to identify a servant who
has cuckolded him by cutting off a lock of his hair while he is asleep. The servant then promptly removes
the same piece of all the other servants’ hair so he cannot be identified. GIOVANNI BOCCACCIO,
DECAMERON 165–69 (J. G. Nichols trans., Everyman’s Library 2008) (1353).
101
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nine pounds just the prior year when one of his charges escaped. Aside from
Yates’s personal experience, widespread colonial practice confirmed that he
had reason to fear: many justice of the peace manuals outlined penalties that
sheriffs would face for failing to preserve their prisoners. 106
Yet the core of Yates’s objections seemed to stem not only from anxiety
about any personal repercussions of failing to control his gaol but also from
an ideological disagreement about the extent of military authority over
civilian institutions. In this respect, it is possible to discern both what
historians have often called “moves” and “mentalités,” and conflicts over
worldview as well as concrete resource constraints. 107 As the rhetoric of the
controversy escalated and additional officials became involved, the legal
stakes of the dispute became increasingly clear, crystallizing around one
position espoused by Lord Loudoun and the other advocated by Yates.
Upon hearing of the gaol break, Yates sought an indictment against
Captain Christy from the grand jury, which was sitting at the time. 108
Concerned that the soldiers would further appropriate the gaol, Yates then
ordered his “gaoler not to commit any prisoner in gaol unless by a warrant
of a magistrate” and “took the keys from him.” An amusing exchange ensued
between Yates and increasingly high-ranking military officials. 109 Yates had
106 See, e.g., WILLIAM SIMPSON, THE PRACTICAL JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH-OFFICER OF
HIS MAJESTY’S PROVINCE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 99 (1761) (“Wherever a person is found guilty . . . of a
negligent escape of a criminal actually in his custody, he is punishable by fine and imprisonment,
according to the quality of the offence.”). On the other side, Loudoun himself, in elaborating upon the
custody arrangements for a prisoner in another case, explained that some sheriffs had allowed those
subject to military justice to escape. As he writes:

On this principle I committed this baker to the Provost’s. The Provost[’s] prison[er] was kept in
one of the rooms of the toan gaol where the sheriff keeps his prisoners. This happened from
several causes. First there was no other place where the provost could keep his prisoners safe from
escape. Secondly I could detain no military prisoners in any gaol in America if committed for
military crimes as the keepers of them have constantly lett them out and I have never been able to
get any redress. And the Sheriff of New York and his gaoler have been particularly guilty in this
practice.
Lord Loudoun, Memorandum Book VII (May 6, 1757) (Loudoun Papers: Americana, Box 10,
Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA); see also 1 Memorandum Book
Typescript. Although using Yates’s gaol, Loudoun employed a military official to supervise military
prisoners.
107 For a discussion of the differences between moves and mentalités and disputes over their relative
importance, see GLENN BURGESS, THE POLITICS OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1603–1642, at 224 (1992).
108 In the letter explaining this to Governor De Lancey, Yates uses an ambiguous pronoun, explaining
that “as the Grand Jury was then sitting I applied to them who have indicted him,” where “him” could
refer back either to Captain Christy or to Jacob Van Der Werken. Subsequent arguments about the
indictment that Yates recounts, however, pinpoints “him” as Captain Christy. See Abraham Yates’s
Journals/Copybook 1754–1758, supra note 16.
109 The language of Yates’s account here gives a flavor both of his own obstinacy and the concrete
implications of the dispute:
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previously cooperated with the military forces, permitting them to employ
the gaol for their “regular prisoners”—presumably those working in a
military capacity and being disciplined for an infraction. At this moment,
Yates’s ideological differences with the British forces do not appear at the
forefront, but rather his concern about the cost of repairing the broken lock
and outrage at the soldiers’ insolence in interfering in such a manner with his
gaol. One might therefore think that immediate conciliation on the part of
the military would repair the breach and the prior arrangement could be
reinstated.
Soon, however, more prominent figures were corralled into the dispute,
and its consequences became more severe, while, at the same time, Yates
and community members were working on Van Der Werken’s release. On
October 11, the farmers whose oxen Van Der Werken had marked gave him
a certificate stating they were satisfied with what he had done, and requesting
his release. Van Der Werken also petitioned General Abercromby, asserting
the circumstances of his actions and asking to be let go. In his response,
Abercromby explained that he would be “very inclined to take compassion,”
but would not budge unless the proceeding by indictment that the grand jury
had commenced was cancelled. Apparently the indictment was not
cancelled, because Van Der Werken “was kept in gaol until the 31 October
with two sentries on him”; at that point, Yates received a writ of habeas
corpus directing Van Der Werken to be brought “before our Trusty and well
beloved John Chambers Esq. [and] our Second Judge [Daniel Horsmanden]
to hold Pleas in our Supurean Court” in New York City. As soon as the writ
of habeas corpus arrived, Yates sent Van Der Werken down to New York
The Next Morning a Corporal came to me and told me that he Wanted to take one of the prisoners
out—and the Gaoler had told him he had Orders from me to the Contrary and that I had taken the
Key from him. I told him it was very right and that for the future I not allow them the Liberty of the
Gaol unless I had satisfaction for the breaking of the gaol the day before. A few minutes after the
sergeant came he went with the same answer—about ten in the same morning, my gaoler came to
my house. I was not in, a few minutes after I came, I found the gaoler at my door. [H]e told me the
[Brigadier Major] was at the City Hall [and] had dem[ande]d him why he did not open the goal.
[W]hen he told him I had the key he dem[ande]d them again and ordered him immediately to go
for the sheriff to tell him the Brigadier Major was there. [A]s he was relating the story the Major
came to my door and had with him four officers of the artillery. [H]e asked one whether I was the
sheriff I told him I was—he told me I was very civil I answered I did not know what he meant, he
told me he had sent me a message and never returned him an answer, I told him that I was busy
receiving his message and by what I observed of it merited no answer—he asked me what I meant
by not giving the key to open the gaol, I told him because I would not, he said he would make me,
I told him that then I would do it immediately—and what I meant by it—I told him the day before
the gaol was broke by the army when it was intire, which was [indecipherable] to that one might
open it with two fingers—and if the army had authority to brake it the day before when whole sure
they must have this day authority to open it when broke and were then is this ceremony of turning
a key to a broken lock I told him I did not understand what he would be at, and thus he left me and
was very angry. The same day I was spoke to by Capt Abercromby, he told me Gen Abercromby
had desired him to speak to me concerning my refusing to commit the regular prisoners, as I had
till then always done it . . . .
Id.
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City with an emissary, and he was discharged on the order of Daniel
Horsmanden on November 9, 1757.
In the meantime, Lord Loudoun, the commander of the British armed
forces in America, stepped into the fray. Yates met with him (after noting
that he had been obliged to wait “a considerable time”) on November 1, and
the two entered into a heated exchange. According to Yates’s sworn
memorandum on the subject, which shows care in hedging the relevant
quotations with alternative language lest Yates’s recollection failed in the
particulars, “His Lordship told me he had seen the Letter I wrote to Governor
De Lancey that it (or the contents thereof) were Lies from beginning to the
End (or ending).” After Yates replied that it was “truth from the beginning
to the End and not one Word false,” Loudoun voiced his animosity toward
legal procedures, explaining that “he would have nothing to do with these
Pettyfogging lawyer[s] who for a couple (or few) shillings would obstruct
(or trouble) Him in his [business] . . . .” He further “insist[ed] upon my
Keeping the Prisoner in Gaol notwithstanding the writ . . . .”
That Loudoun had, in fact, seen the letter is revealed by his
Memorandum Book entry for October 20, 1757, in which he explains that
Governor De Lancey had shown him the letter and that “[t]he Lt Govr is to
writ to the sheriff that if he be not quiet he will bring himself to a great dale
of trouble . . . .” 110 Things went from bad to worse when Yates revealed that
he had already released Van Der Werken pursuant to the writ. Loudoun
ranted that Governor De Lancey had informed him that Yates was a
“troublesome man” and that the Governor would independently
communicate with Yates. 111 More significantly, Loudoun required Yates to
“go nowhere . . . without his orders.” He also demanded that Yates “[t]end
upon him every day” by seven in the morning, specifying that if Yates did
not show up, he would have him “fitched by a file of Musquetiers with their
Bayenets fixed.” He added a set of threats of retribution “if no end was made
of the affair of Christie and [Yates] served a Writt on him on Account of the
Inditement or Bill,” stating that he would take Yates’s own house as a
hospital for the troops and turn the church into a store.
The next day, explaining that he had forgotten to record the episode the
previous evening, Loudoun included his own account of this conversation in
his Memorandum Books. As he explained,

110 Lord Loudoun, 9 Memorandum Books (Oct. 20, 1757) (Loudoun Papers: Americana, Box 10,
Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA); see also 3 Memorandum Book
Typescript.
111 The remainder of this paragraph again relies on Yates Memorandum/Copybook, 1754–1758,
supra note 16.
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The sheriff came to acquaint me he had received a Habeas Corpus for the
man that was committed by Capt Christie up by the post and that he had
liberated him.
I showed him that if I was to have all the harassment from every little lawier
that would take any cause, lett it be never so bad, I knew what I had a right to
and I would take the whole.

He then records having speculated to Major General Abercromby that “this
was a beginning in order to trie their power, sett on foot by the lawiers with
the sheriff at their head, and that I thought it fitt for me to putt an end to it.” 112
The following day, November 2, Loudoun proceeded to follow through
on these menacing statements, telling the Mayor “to make ready to billit
thirteen hundred men and the staff and to provide them necessaries as wood
bedding and materials to dress their victuals with and if they did not do it he
would burn their houses;” Loudoun likewise noted “that he wanted a store
and would take the church for it and ordered the major to take the benches
out,” and, finally, told Yates “to empty the gaol that he had prisoners under
sentence of death . . . and the first that would oppose him he would break his
head.” 113 Loudoun had already expressed concerns in his Memorandum
Books about quartering troops, so Pargellis may be correct that he simply
took advantage of the dispute with Yates as an excuse to provide himself
with necessary resources for the army. 114
Loudoun himself recorded his commands about quartering, writing that
he sent for the mayor and sheriff and
told them I had now been among them above a year, that I had given them every
indulgence in my poer, that last year I had for the troops quartered here,
demanded nothing but hooseroom, though by the Articles of War I was intitled
to take good bedes, fier and candel, small beer, vinegar and salt. That since they
were not satisfied with the indulgences I had given them and had now entered
into a resolution to trie what was their rights and what was ours, and that in
order to (do) this were giving every harassment in their power, and stiring up

112 Lord Loudoun, 9 Memorandum Books (Nov. 2, 1757) (Loudoun Papers: Americana, Box 10,
Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA); see also 3 Memorandum Book
Typescript.
113 Abraham Yates, Jr., Journals/Copybook 1754–1758 (Abraham Yates, Jr. Papers, Box 4,
Manuscripts and Archives Division, N.Y. Pub. Library).
114 PARGELLIS, supra note 8, at 45; Lord Loudoun, 9 Memorandum Books (Oct. 12, 1757) (Loudoun
Papers: Americana, Box 10, Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA) (noting
Loudoun’s discussion of quarters with Governor De Lancey); see also 3 Memorandum Book Typescript.
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every little lawier to prosecut every publick officer, I was determined to change
my method and insist upon what I had a right to . . . . 115

He followed this declaration with an order for immediate quartering. 116
While the details of the controversy demonstrate the extent to which it
emanated from a personality conflict between two forceful and stubborn
individuals, the November 1 conversation between Yates and Loudoun
simultaneously crystallized a theoretical source for their differences, one that
persists throughout subsequent materials documenting the episode. Lord
Loudoun—as ventriloquized by Yates—opined that
my Lord Chancellor told him before he Left England that wherever there was a
Necessity for an army to Maintain a Country that their the Law was not in force
But that the army were to have the administration, and that those that would
oppose it ought to be hanged and that Christy did Right in Breaking the Gaol
when I would not open it For him . . . .

Loudoun’s attribution of his own position to Lord Chancellor Hardwicke—
although unsupported by additional documentation—is significant because
it suggests a British imperial policy in development rather than the
anomalous interpretation of a rogue official. Yates, by contrast, insisted that
this position was “against the Law of God, Law of England, and the Law of
Nature,” adducing in support of his own view the Bible (particularly Kings
17), John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, especially the first seven
chapters, and various aspects of English law, including the “first section of
the habeas corpus act” 117 and the fifth section of the “petition of right.” 118
Yates’s passing citation of the Habeas Corpus Act placed him on one
side of an implicit fight about the force of English statutes within the
American colonies. 119 While it was generally acknowledged that any statutes
in affirmance of the common law passed before 1691 applied in New York
115 Lord Loudoun, 9 Memorandum Books (Nov. 2, 1757) (Loudoun Papers: Americana, Box 10,
Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA); see also 3 Memorandum Book
Typescript.
116 Lord Loudoun, 9 Memorandum Books (Nov. 2, 1757) (Loudoun Papers: Americana, Box 10,
Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA); see also 3 Memorandum Book
Typescript.
117 Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2, c.2, 3 STATUTES AT LARGE FROM MAGNA CHARTA, TO THE
END OF THE LAST PARLIAMENT, 1761, at 397–410. The first section mandated that sheriffs bring the body
of anyone who was the subject of a writ of habeas corpus before the court issuing the writ within three
days. Id. at § 1.
118 Petition of Right 1628, 3 Car. 1, § 5.
119 See Tyler, supra note 20, at 64–65 (treating the debates over the applicability of the Habeas
Corpus Act in America). See generally WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS
CORPUS (1980) (treating the reception of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 throughout the colonies);
Herbert Alan Johnson, English Statutes in Colonial New York, 58 N.Y. HISTORY 277 (1977) (addressing
how these battle lines were drawn in colonial New York).
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as well, in 1764, Chief Justice Daniel Horsmanden—the same judge who had
released Van Der Werken—would articulate the position widely held among
colonial lawyers that all pre-1691 statutes in derogation of the common law
were also in force. 120 New York lawyer William Smith had already expressed
the same view in 1756. 121 Yet some pre-1691 English statutes were not used
in New York and some post-1691 laws were. Furthermore, the Privy
Council’s Committee of Trade and Plantations had previously vetoed New
York’s “Charter of Liberties and Privileges” on the grounds that the Habeas
Corpus Act did not extend to America. 122 Hence colonial lawyers did not
voice a truism when representing habeas corpus in New York as protected
by the Habeas Corpus Act as well as the common law writ, but instead
adopted a contested position.
Loudoun’s spat with Yates was not the only instance in which Loudoun
assumed control over a civilian offender. In May of 1757, Loudoun took
issue with a New York baker, who deliberately used sour flour. He
committed the baker to the provost marshal and kept in the latter’s room at
the gaol. 123 Loudoun justified this procedure “by the principle that a power
was seated in a commanding officer during war for the preservation of the
troops, and that if the man had been confined in a civilian prison, he would
have been permitted to escape.” 124
In elaborating on his own view of the underlying legal principles, Yates
acknowledged that during a rebellion, “the army should have the
Administration” and that “it would Be absurd to Insist on Liberty or
Property,” explaining that in “Part of a Country Ready Unavoidably to fall
In the hands of the enemy I think the army should have the administration to
Burn and Destroy It for fear the spoil should fall In the hands of the
120

Johnson, supra note 119, at 279–80; see also THE REPORT OF AN ACTION OF ASSAULT, BATTERY,

AND WOUNDING, TRIED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR THE PROVINCE OF NEW-YORK, IN

TERM OF OCTOBER 1764, BETWEEN THOMAS FORSEY, PLAINTIFF, AND WADDEL CUNNINGHAM,
DEFENDANT 9 (1764) (“The Supreme Court here proceeds in the Main, according to the Practice of the
Courts at Westminster; and the Common Law of England, with the Statutes affirming, or altering it,
before a Legislature was established here, and those passed since such Establishment, expressly extended
to us, with our legislative Acts (which are not to be repugnant to the Laws of England) constitute the
Laws of this Colony.”).
121 DUKER, supra note 119, at 111.
122 Id. at 108; Johnson, supra note 119, at 281–82.
123 PARGELLIS, supra note 8, at 294.
124 Id. Pargellis’s account is based upon Loudoun’s Memorandum Books at the Huntington Library,
although he incorrectly identifies the date as April rather than May. Id. at 295 n.21. The Memorandum
Books demonstrate that Loudoun’s decision was not uncontested. In an entry from May 1, Loudoun
details the baker’s crime and explains that “Mr. Santt the laier (lawyer) and his brother came to Sir Charles
Hardy’s and debated the case.” Lord Loudoun, 7 Memorandum Books (May 1, 1757) (Loudoun Papers:
Americana, Box 10, Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA); see also
1 Memorandum Book Typescript.
THE
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Enemy . . . .” 125 Yates considered these situations of “emergency” as
appropriate for the exercise of prerogative powers. Yet they represent limited
exceptions to the freedom of liberty and property extolled by Locke, to which
Yates contrasted his conception of French kingship as an absolute power
vested in the monarch. Under the British system, by contrast, Yates averred,
the law controls the King and not vice versa. As he maintained:
The Law is both the measure and the Bond of Every Subjects Duty and
Allegiance [crossed out twice then spelled again a third time] each man having
a fixed foundamental Right Born with him as to freedom of his Person and
Property in his estate which he cannot be Deprived of but either by his Consent
or some Crime for which the Law has Imposed Such a Penalty or
Forfeiture . . . .

A third perspective emerges from Acting Governor De Lancey’s letter
to which Lord Loudoun had referred, a missive that reached Yates belatedly,
although dated October 24. 126 In the 1720s, De Lancey, who was from a
prominent New York family and solidified his landholdings by marriage, had
studied in England at both Cambridge and Lincoln’s Inn prior to becoming
chief justice in New York. 127 Lamenting in his letter that “[I] am sorry there
Should any difference arise Between the civil and military,” De Lancey
expressed the view that “the Kings Gaol must Be opened to secure
delinquents against the Military Law.” At the same time, he distinguished
between the recourse available to civilians and members of the military,
explaining that, “if the officers send a Souldier to Gaol as he is subject to
military Discipline no one can Complain . . . .” On the other hand, “[I]f they
send a man not subject to their discipline the Law gives him a Remedy which
he may take . . . .” Hence De Lancey viewed civil law as still applying to
those in military custody. Nevertheless, he continued, addressing Yates, “in
neither case are you answerable because they are not in your Custody or your
prisoners.” According to this view, Van Der Werken would be on his own in
seeking redress for his injuries and Yates would be deprived of authority
over his case: “If this van Der Werken Has been injured by any body let him
Take his remedy against those who did The injury.” The letter concludes
with a treatment of other army business and instructions about improving the
highways for the benefit of the troops. Here again the practical
considerations entailed by the military presence in upstate New York are

125

This paragraph relies on Abraham Yates’s Journals/Copybook, 1754–1758, supra note 16.
Id.
127 STANLEY NIDER KATZ, NEWCASTLE’S NEW YORK: ANGLO-AMERICAN POLITICS, 1732–1753, at
166 (1968).
126
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intermingled with theoretical debates about the nature and extent of military
authority.
Loudoun, Yates, and De Lancey thus adopted three disparate positions.
Loudoun’s view—attributed to Lord Chancellor Hardwicke—approved of
the suspension of civil law as well as civil remedies like habeas corpus in
areas requiring military occupation. Yates’s perspective emphasized the
distinction between two kinds of military necessity and the attendant exercise
of the King’s prerogative: the first called for during occupation of enemy
territory or in cases of rebellion, would allow for civil authority to be
superseded, whereas the second, which he deems applicable to the British
forces in America, entails the presence of armed forces while civil order
remains generally in force. Finally, De Lancey distinguished both between
the objects of military discipline and between the initial exercise of authority
and the availability of a remedy. Hence, he drew a stark contrast between
military and civilian personnel yet suggested that even when a civilian is
involved, military administration should supersede civilian, and that judicial
remedies are the only recourse available.
Aspects of these positions would reemerge in later contexts, including,
most prominently, those of the Civil War. At the same time, they show the
marks of their peculiar origins at a moment when the expansion of the British
Empire raised questions about whether British approaches to military
authority domestically, such as encapsulated in the Petition of Right and
subsequent legislation, would apply when British forces operated in colonial
territories and when members of the colonies were beginning to formulate
arguments—phrased in the terms of English law itself—against what they
perceived as tyrannical treatment. Under this account, it was not incidental
that Loudoun attributed the position he espoused to Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke, nor was it a coincidence that Yates would later become a
prominent Antifederalist. Instead, Loudoun’s view represented a position
being tried out by British officials developing their relation to prerogative
powers, particularly in foreign territories, and Yates’s experience
conditioned his later suspicion of broad federal powers.
In 1756, the year before this controversy, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke
had intervened in debate about a new version of the Militia Bill, one that
wound up being defeated in the House of Lords. 128 In his remarks, Hardwicke
expressed sympathy for having a domestic militia and dissociated himself
from views critical of standing armies. At the same time, he opposed the bill
as infringing on “the Prerogative of the Crown.” 129 After rehearsing the
128

PHILLIP YORKE EARL OF HARDWICKE, TWO SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS. I. ON THE BILL,
(1758).
Id. at 45–47.

FOR ABOLISHING THE HERETABLE JURISDICTIONS IN SCOTLAND. II. ON THE MILITIA-BILL 43–77
129
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events leading up to King Charles I’s beheading, Hardwicke noted that even
in the aftermath of the English Revolution, Parliament had affirmed the
King’s authority over the military upon the Restoration of King Charles II to
the throne. This bill, by contrast, remained silent on the subject, a silence he
construes as excluding royal prerogative over the militia. As he concluded,
“by this Bill, the Power of the Militia is taken away from the Crown.” 130
Hardwicke expressed particular concern about how emergencies that
might arise would be addressed. The Militia Bill as drafted furnished
authority to the King to address such circumstances only in a circumscribed
fashion, specifying that “in case of actual Invasion, or imminent Danger
thereof; or in case of Rebellion, it shall and may be lawful for his Majesty . . .
to order and direct his Lieutenants, . . . to draw out and embody all the
Regiments and Companies of Militia Men . . . .” 131 As Hardwicke pointed
out, however, even this use of power would require a formal notice to
Parliament and might vitiate the availability of emergency powers when
Parliament happened to be out of session. 132
His further objection to the bill entailed its displacement of military
discipline by the civil powers. As he lamented: “The whole Discipline of the
Militia is by this Bill taken out of the Deputy Lieutenants, and the Officers
of the Militia, and put into the Justices of the Peace, excepting only at the
particular Times when they shall be marched out for actual Service.” 133
Military personnel were not even barred from resorting to a writ of certiorari,
leading Hardwicke to “congratulate my Friends, the Judges of the King’s
Bench, on their being made Inspectors General of this Army.” 134
Hardwicke hence insisted on royal prerogative powers over the military
domestically, but I have found few direct indications of his views about
martial law in the colonies. He did, importantly, defend the principle of not
extending the Habeas Corpus Act to Ireland in 1758. As Hardwicke
explained: “It has been often attempted and has as often, in the best of times,
been rejected on account of the state of Ireland, which made it not safe for

130

Id. at 54.
Id. at 51.
132 Id. at 52–53.
133 Id. at 59.
134 Id. at 60–61. When Lord Loudoun was recalled to England, he made a tour of government to
explain himself and redeem his reputation. During the course of this tour, he received conflicting advice
about whether to attend debate on this Habeas Corpus Act and ultimately decided not to do so given the
political sensitivity of the subject.
131
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the King’s Protestant subjects there.” 135 A similar claim was subsequently
made regarding Quebec. 136
This argument also bears some resemblance to the one Lord Loudoun
attributed to Hardwicke, “that wherever there was a Necessity for an army
to Maintain a Country that their the Law was not in force But that the army
were to have the administration.” The logic of this statement seems
particularly applicable to colonial sites rather than the metropole itself. The
reference itself to “an army to Maintain a Country” suggests an occupying
force rather than domestic troops called up to put down an insurgency or
respond to an invading enemy—circumstances that, in any event, Yates
himself acknowledged might justify having civil authorities temporarily
cede their power to the military forces. In particular, this argument raises the
specter of a situation not otherwise specifically contemplated within
discussions of martial law, the context of a country already conquered and
subordinated as a colony but in which either domestic resistance or foreign
conflict over possession produced an armed occupation.
A further issue pertaining to the respective roles of colonial governors
and military commanders that was playing out in different colonial sites
during this period also manifested itself during Lord Loudoun’s stint in
America. In a private letter dated October 17, 1757, Lord Loudoun
complains about Massachusetts Governor Thomas Pownall. Although
Loudoun claims to be “great friends” with Pownall, he insults him in the
most opprobrious terms and details a discussion in which he “showed
[Pownall] the Command was totally Military, that in no shape the Governor
could have any Command over them, and that if [he] had the Command, it
must descend in [his] Absence to the next Officer in Rank, and so on to the
End.” 137 He also recounts Pownall expressing the opposing view that “except
in time of War the Military Power came in to support the Civil; where it
could not execute its own Orders all Business must stand still and the
Country be undone.” 138 Much of the correspondence between Loudoun and
Pownall demonstrates the substantial controversy between the two about the
nature and limits of military and prerogative powers. 139
135 Jean-Marie Fecteau & Douglas Hay, ‘Government by Will and Pleasure Instead of Law’: Military
Justice and the Legal System in Quebec, 1775–83, in 1 CANADIAN STATE TRIALS: LAW, POLITICS, AND
SECURITY MEASURES, 1608–1837, at 129, 146 (F. Murray Greenwood & Barry Wright eds., 1996).
136 Id. at 159.
137 Letter from Loudoun to Cumberland (Oct. 17, 1757), in MILITARY AFFAIRS IN NORTH AMERICA,
1748–1765: SELECTED DOCUMENTS FROM THE CUMBERLAND PAPERS IN WINDSOR CASTLE 399, 404,
406 (Stanley Pargellis ed., 1936).
138 Id. at 406.
139 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Pownall to Lord Loudoun (Nov. 27, 1757) (Loudoun Papers:
Americana, Box 104, Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA) (describing how
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Turning back to Yates, the effects of the 1750s controversy appear in
his writings around the Founding Era. In the interim, Yates had imbibed the
writings of De Lolme, who, as mentioned above, vigorously contrasted the
English mode of government with continental models, particularly insofar as
it subordinated the military to the civil aspects of government. 140 In The
Rough Hewer, directed at members of the New York state legislature,
Yates—joined by his nephew, Robert Yates—expressed the necessity of a
Bill of Rights, denying that “the Rulers ought to have the power to keep a
standing army . . . command the Militia, and order them when and where
they pleased.” 141 In rehearsing various historical episodes involving a
deprivation of liberty, Yates explicitly treated Lord Loudoun and
summarized what he had taken away from the 1757 controversy. Yates
wrote:
The Earl of Loudoun (a gentleman of imperious and arbitrary disposition), was
said to have so extensive a commission as to be a sort of viceroy; and had,
besides the command of the army, all the governors from North Carolina to
New Hampshire, subordinate to him), arrived in 1756 and was for having the
civil authority subordinate to the Military: He said (and often said) that it was
the opinion of the Lord Chancellor that it ought to be the case in every Country,
that required an army to defend it; and of a Piece with this was the order of
George the 3d (George the 2nd died 5 October 1760) of the 17 December 1760
Directing the Commander of the troops to Rank above the governor of a
colony. 142

While he had not forgotten the personal dimension of the quarrel, Yates had
by this point distilled the ideological kernel of his objections.
From Yates’s encounter with Loudoun, we can see a different
dimension of the debates over habeas corpus and martial law. At issue were
not simply questions of what law would apply—military or civilian—or
whether remedies might be available after the fact, but who precisely would
be charged with overseeing the administration of justice. This concern with
personnel has faded into the background of our understanding of the

he remains bound by laws accepted by his predecessors that cut into the prerogative powers of a
governor).
140 See De Lolme, supra note 58. In his 1786 notes on speeches to the delegates of Congress, Yates
refers extensively to De Lolme. See Abraham Yates, Jr., “Speeches to the Delegates of Congress”
(Abraham Yates, Jr. Papers, Box 5, Manuscripts and Archives Division, N.Y. Pub. Library).
141 Abraham Yates, Jr., “The Rough Hewer” (Dec. 4, 1788) (Abraham Yates, Jr. Papers, Box 5,
Manuscripts and Archives Division, N.Y. Pub. Library).
142 Id.
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Constitution, but it resonates with other Founding Era controversies, such as
those over the administration of federal law. 143
A similar notion of martial law as changing who was applying the law
rather than what law was applied would also manifest itself later in the
history of the British Empire. Reflecting back on his service as a governor in
India in 1799, the Duke of Wellington proclaimed both the superiority of
military personnel over civilian during occupation and the lack of any
necessary implication of that circumstance for the administration of law. As
he recalled:
I have, in another country, carried out martial law; that is to say, I have governed
a large proportion of the population of a country by my own will. But then, what
did I do? I declared that the country should be governed according to its own
national law, and I carried into execution that my so declared will . . . . The
judges sat in the courts of law, conducting their judicial business, and
administering the law under my direction. 144

The dissociation between the question of military or civilian control of
government and the mode of carrying out justice that Wellington describes
had already been suggested by the arguments made in the 1757 controversy
in upstate New York between Lord Loudoun and Abraham Yates.
CONCLUSION: THE STAKES FOR ORIGINAL MEANING
So what, if any, are the implications of this 1757 controversy for
originalist constitutional interpretation?
First, the dispute suggests that cordoning off the history of habeas
corpus from martial law might be a mistake. As noted above, Professor
Tyler’s comprehensive book on habeas considers the implications of martial
law only beginning with the American Civil War. 145 Others have insisted
upon a strict demarcation between the historical treatment of habeas corpus
and martial law. 146 On the other side, Professor Vladeck has most
143

See generally Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J.
1104 (2013) (explaining the significance of whether local or federal forces would implement federal law
to early debates about commandeering). Notably, Yates figures prominently in Campbell’s account as
resisting a large federal bureaucracy to implement taxes. Id. at 1120–21. This stance was probably
influenced by his earlier encounter with Lord Loudoun. For a discussion of disputes over the relation
between military and civil authority in the Northwest Territory that resonates with the concerns of the
controversy between Yates and Loudoun, see generally Gregory Ablavsky, Administrative
Constitutionalism in the Northwest Territory, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming) (draft on file with the author).
144 April 1, 1851, in 2 THE SPEECHES OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON IN PARLIAMENT 723–24 (1854).
145 TYLER, supra note 20.
146 In The Imbecilic Executive, Professor Sai Prakash draws a bright line between the Crown’s
prerogative regarding martial law—which he acknowledges was an area of significant dispute—and the
suspension of habeas corpus, writing that “whatever uncertainty existed about martial law, it was clear
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comprehensively elaborated the martial law justification for suspension,
examining an obscure opinion that investigated President Lincoln’s power
to suspend the writ. 147 In deciding the 1862 case of Ex parte Field, U.S.
District Judge David A. Smalley claimed that, “so long as the President had
authority to impose martial law, he had authority to suspend the privilege of
the writ wherever martial law was in force.” 148 This authority to impose
martial law would have derived from early Militia Acts.149 Professor Vladeck
furnishes a strong historically based defense of Smalley’s position but
concludes by raising the possibility that a martial law-based suspension of
habeas might be incompatible with the Suspension Clause.
Martial law itself, however, as this Essay indicates, furnished part of
the context out of which the Suspension Clause emerged and, hence,
provides a potential interpretive backdrop for understanding the meaning of
the provision. Not only was the first suspension passed the same year as the
Mutiny Act of 1689, but the dispute between Yates and Loudoun illuminates
the various arguments that were made in the mid-eighteenth century about
the relationship between civil law remedies like habeas corpus and martial
law. Whereas Governor De Lancey believed that those held in military
custody could still avail themselves of remedies through the courts of
common law, Loudoun held that military jurisdiction entirely displaced
“every little lawier’s” arguments. Likewise, we see in these disputes a
prefiguration of the arguments that the Duke of Wellington and William
Birkhimer would later make that the courts could remain open even under
martial law.
Second, originalists have, in other contexts, tended to draw a strong
distinction between common law and statutes in derogation thereof,
interpreting the Constitution in light of the former but distinguishing the
latter. 150 The interplay of statutes with prerogative powers in relation to
martial law—as well as habeas—suggests both the crucial importance of
statutes as well as common law to the backdrop of the Constitution and the
complexity of relying on English statutes as a given within the American
colonies. In practice, colonists often invoked English laws even if British
authorities rejected their applicability within the colonies. 151 This raises
interpretive questions about which understanding should be accepted and
that the Crown could not suspend habeas corpus.” Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Imbecilic
Executive, 99 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1381 (2013).
147 See generally Vladeck, supra note 19.
148 Id. at 395 (citing Ex parte Field, 9 F. Cas. 1 (C.C.D. Vt. 1862)).
149 Id. at 395–96. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts,
114 YALE L.J. 149 (2004).
150 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 124–127 and accompanying text.
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whether local interpretations and practices in America should trump British
conceptions; concluding that they should could further undermine
originalists’ reliance on late eighteenth-century British sources like William
Blackstone’s Commentaries, which largely encapsulate the British
perspective. 152 Furthermore, the relationship between prerogative and
statutory deployments of martial law as well as the compatibility of martial
law with common law was hotly contested within the British Empire. 153 In
addition, once the door is opened to interpreting constitutional provisions
against a set of British statutes, questions arise as to where the limits of that
statutory framework might be. In particular, with regard to the Suspension
Clause, it may not be advisable to restrict investigation to legislation
pertaining specifically to habeas corpus but rather expand more broadly into
the range of statutes furnishing guidance for the implementation of martial
law.
Finally, this episode demonstrates the extent to which the legal
framework of England represented not simply a static backdrop for the
development of the Constitution but a contested and dynamic space in which
military commanders’ imperial justifications vied with the arguments of
colonial subjects based on English law and the claims of colonial governors
caught between their allegiance to the metropole and their attention to the
domestic legal regimes developing in the colonies and the rights claimed by
colonists. Within this system, common law and its alternatives did not
furnish a fixed set of doctrines according to which provisions of the
Constitution can be interpreted but instead a set of resources for argument in
a fraught imperial dominion.

152
153
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See supra Part I.

